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THE OPIOID CRISIS IN INDIAN COUNTRY: THE IMPACT 





Opioids have been a significant part of pain treatment in the United 
States for over 150 years.
1
 Stories of overdose from the early nineteenth 
century are almost indistinguishable from stories today.
2
 For example, Ella 
Henderson was a thirty-three-year-old hotel owner in high society Seattle, 
Washington.
3
 Following the death of her beloved father, Ms. Henderson 
sought the help of doctors, who were ready and willing to prescribe to her a 
cutting-edge new treatment for both physical and emotional pain: 
morphine.
4
 Liberal prescription was the practice of the time, and like many 
others, Ms. Henderson was soon overwhelmed by addiction.
5
 Referred to in 
the local newspaper as a “Beautiful Opium Eater,”
6
 her community shunned 
her, and she died alone in her room; the year was 1877.
7
 
By the turn of the twentieth century, Congress began to respond to an 
epidemic indistinguishable from the one the United States faces today 
through enactment of the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906.
8
 Congress also 
passed the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act of 1914
9
 and the Anti-Heroin Act of 
                                                                                                             
 * Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
 1. See Clinton Lawson, America’s 150-Year Opioid Epidemic, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 
2018, at 10. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768, 768 (“For preventing the manufacture, sale, or transportation 
of adulterated or misbranded or poisonous or deleterious foods, drugs, medicines, and 
liquors, and for regulating traffic therein, and for other purposes.”). 
 9. Ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785, 785 (“To provide for the registration of, with collectors of 
internal revenue, and to impose a special tax upon all persons who produce, import, 
manufacture, compound, deal in, dispense, sell, distribute, or give away opium or coca 
leaves, their salts, derivatives, or preparations, and for other purposes.”). 
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 in the wake of the twentieth century opioid epidemic. These 
congressional acts worked to prevent the flow of illicit opiates in the United 
States but failed to control the origin of addiction that led to their use—the 
medical community’s over-prescription of these problematic narcotics.
11
 
On the heels of the Roaring Twenties and the Great Depression, 
America’s focus soon turned to war, pushing the danger of opioids out of 
the public eye. As veterans returned from World War II battlefields, 
families began to grow. Although the 1950s is often characterized by 
conformity and conservatism, abuse and misuse of opiates lurked in the 
background until the 1970s, when Congress again responded.
12
 This time, 
Congress attempted to control first the source of legal opiates—doctors and 
pharmacies—and second, the illicit sources of opiates on the black 
market.
13
 Over the course of the next two decades, doctors were instructed 
to give opioids sparingly for chronic pain unless the patient was at death’s 
door.
14
 Doctors and nurses were so concerned “drug addiction itself [would] 
become a hideous spectacle” that they often under-used opioids, even 
below the suggested dosage based on the circumstances.
15
 
As the cloud that followed opiates through the 1970s began to lift by the 
mid-1980s, cancer specialists challenged the notion that long-term opiate 
use would “lead the unwitting patient down the primrose path to 
addiction.”
16
 One doctor in particular, Dr. Kathleen Foley, then of the 
Memorial-Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in New York City, was especially 
influential in the resurgence of pain management through long-term opiate 
use.
17
 Dr. Foley published two studies in the early 1980s that showed 
addiction to be “rare among inpatients.”
18
 Dr. Foley’s justification for 
opioid use was that there were no long-term studies showing that pain 
patients were likely to become addicted.
19
 The reality of the claim, 
                                                                                                             
 10. Ch. 352, 43 Stat. 657, 657 (“Prohibiting the importation of crude opium for the 
purpose of manufacturing heroin.”). 
 11. See Lawson, supra note 1.  
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Marcia L. Meldrum, The Ongoing Opioid Prescription Epidemic, 106 AJPH 1365, 
1365 (2016). 
 15. Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
 16. Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
 17. Id.  
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. 
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Doctors celebrated Dr. Foley’s work and felt emboldened to introduce 
opiates as a part of chronic pain treatment. Patients felt empowered by 
doctors trusting them to take part in their own pain management.
21
 During 
the 1990s, prescriptions for opioids began to rise across the country, and the 
pharmaceutical industry spread the word about opioids, sponsoring 
presentations by physicians “championing chronic opioid therapy.”
22
 It was 




In the early 2000s, pharmaceutical manufacturer Purdue launched a 
nationwide advertisement campaign promoting its newest opioid product, 
OxyContin.
24
 That ad campaign included language billing OxyContin as 
non-addictive because of its slow release in the body.
25
 One ad stated, “in 
fact, the rate of addiction amongst pain-patients who are treated by doctors 
is much less than one percent . . . . These drugs, which I repeat are our best, 
strongest pain medications, should be used much more than they are for 
patients in pain.”
26
 Legitimate doctors and “pill-mill” operators alike 
prescribed OxyContin widely for all types of ailments.
27
 OxyContin became 
popular on the black market because low-income patients were willing to 
sell from the almost unlimited prescriptions they received, and the pills 
themselves were easily crushed into powder to enable the desired high for 
the end user.
28
 Feeling the pinch of high OxyContin prices, recreational 
users soon found a cheaper alternative in black tar heroin.
29
 Heroin 
traffickers took notice of the high use of OxyContin and other prescription 
opioids in middle America and capitalized on the opportunity.
30
 The 
                                                                                                             
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Understanding the Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html (last updated Dec. 19, 2018). 
 24. Meldrum, supra note 14, at 1366. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Our Amazing World, Purdue Pharma OxyContin Commercial, YOUTUBE (Sept. 22, 
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Er78Dj5hyeI.  
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
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increase in heroin use led to a sharp 137 percent increase in overdose deaths 
between 2000 and 2014.
31
 
This brings us to the present day, which is known as the “third wave” of 
the opioid crisis. The third wave is characterized by the rise of synthetic 
opioids, primarily illicitly manufactured fentanyl (IMF).
32
 Heroin, IMF, and 
prescription opioid misuse and abuse are decimating communities across 
the country. In 2016 and 2017 alone, 11.4 million people misused opioids, 
2.1 million people suffered non-fatal opioid overdose, 2 million people 
misused for the first time, and 42,000 people died from an opioid 
overdose.
33
 During the same time frame, 886,000 people used heroin, 
81,000 of which used for the first time. As a result, 15,469 people died of a 




The Native American community has experienced particularly 
devastating impacts from the opioid crisis. Part I of this Comment will 
discuss the impact of the crisis on Native communities and how the federal 
government’s response has failed Native peoples. In response to that 
failure, the Cherokee Nation filed the first legal action in tribal court in an 
attempt to protect its citizens and hold the pharmaceutical industry 
responsible for the catastrophic impact on the Tribe.  
Part II will lay out the procedural posture and the dismissal of the 
Nation’s suit by way of a tribal jurisdiction decision in federal district court. 
Part II will then analyze the court’s opinion and ultimate decision to rule in 
favor of the opioid defendants by relying on the jurisdiction test laid out in 
Montana v. United States.
35
 Part II will argue that the district court erred in 
its ruling for the pharmaceutical defendants when it enjoined the Cherokee 
Nation from civil litigation in its tribal court. By reviewing case law citing 
to Montana and the exhaustion doctrine, Part II will show that the district 
court should have applied the exhaustion doctrine in the case. This Part will 
argue that the district court was not precluded from applying the exhaustion 
doctrine but rather that current Supreme Court precedent welcomes its use 
to further the recognition of tribal sovereignty. 
Part III will discuss the procedural posture of the most recent 
development in the Cherokee Nation’s opioid litigation. In a multi-district 
                                                                                                             
 31. Id. 
 32. Understanding the Epidemic, supra note 23. 
 33. What Is the U.S. Opioid Epidemic?, HHS.GOV/OPIOIDS, https://www.hhs.gov/ 
opioids/about-the-epidemic/index.html (last reviewed Jan. 22, 2019). 
 34. Id. 
 35. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
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litigation suit in Federal District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, 
Eastern Division, the Tribe’s claims were summarily dismissed from 
Oklahoma state district court based on the federal officer removal statute. 
Part III will discuss how this decision fell short of the statute’s standard, 
and that the court should have allowed the Tribe to participate in the State 
of Oklahoma’s litigation against the opioid defendants. 
The rulings discussed in Part II and Part IIIhave forced the Cherokee 
Nation into litigating in federal court in an unfamiliar venue or dropping the 
suit altogether. While the Cherokee Nation is stuck in a holding pattern, the 
first trial against opioid defendants was held in Cleveland County, 
Oklahoma.
36
 After a bench trial, the judge found Johnson and Johnson 
liable for damages in a nuisance action.
37
 The judge awarded the state $527 




Rory Wheeler is a member of the Seneca Nation of Indians in New York 
and an emergency medical technician for the Tribe.
39
 Wheeler, at only 
nineteen years old, has already seen the serious impact the opioid epidemic 
is having on Indian Country.
40
 In October of 2016, Wheeler responded to 
two separate calls for “female possible overdose” in one day.
41
 Both of 
these young women were members of the Seneca Tribe, both were mothers 
to young children, and both died on the scene.
42
 Wheeler said this was the 
day that “changed [his] life,” and he “began to realize that the issue of 




The crisis has hit communities across the country hard, and Indian 
Country has not been immune from its impact. Poverty and poor health 
make Native American communities acutely vulnerable to the opioid 
                                                                                                             
 36. Oklahoma v. Johnson & Johnson, No. CJ-2017-816 (Cleveland Cty. Dist, Ct., Aug. 
26, 2019).  
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Suzette Brewer, Tribes Lead the Battle to Combat a National Opioid Crisis, HIGH 
COUNTRY NEWS (May 9, 2018), https://www.hcn.org/articles/tribal-affairs-tribes-lead-the-
battle-to-combat-a-national-opioid-crisis. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
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, as “[f]or centuries, [Native American communities] have suffered 
from the effects of war, disease, forced relocation, famine, poverty and 
intergenerational trauma—all of this reflect[ing] [] the poorest health 
statistics of any racial group in the United States.”
45
 Between 1999 and 
2015, overdose rates in Indian Country had increased by 500 percent.
46
 
Accordingly, one in ten Native American children will misuse prescription 
opioids, a figure twice that of white children.
47
 Their mothers, too, often 
struggle with opioid abuse; indeed, “pregnant Native people are eight times 
more likely to be diagnosed with opioid dependence than pregnant white 
folks.”
48
 Native Americans make up only 2 percent of the U.S. population, 
but they die of opioid overdose at the highest rate of any group in the 
country.
49
 High use rates by Native Americans are likely tied to over-
prescription at Indian Health Service (IHS) facilities.
50
 Many remote tribes 
have a difficult time bringing in health professionals, and as a result, 
receive “direct services” from IHS and must accept the method of pain 
management that IHS provides.
51
  
The crisis has forced many tribes to reallocate funds from important 
programs—like housing and heating assistance—to fund the court system, 
law enforcement, social services, and treatment programs to deal with the 
ever-increasing number of people impacted by opioid use.
52
 In particular, 
tribes are struggling to handle a significant increase in Indian Child Welfare 
Act (ICWA) cases.
53
 That sharp increase in cases is alleged to be a result of 
the opioid epidemic.
54
 While most tribes do their best to place Native 
children with family members or other tribal members, many are simply 
running out of homes for placement.
55
 Many kids end up in homes outside 
of the tribe and risk losing the bond with their home and culture.
56
 
                                                                                                             
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Stephanie Valenzuela, In Plain Sight: How the Opioid Crisis Has Ravaged Indian 
Country, LAKOTA PEOPLES LAW PROJECT (July 5, 2018), https://www.lakotalaw.org/news/ 
2018-07-05/opioid-crisis. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Brewer, supra note 39. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
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Even the Cherokee Nation, one of the country’s largest Indian nations, 
has been impacted by an increase of ICWA placements.
57
 The Cherokee 
Nation went from two ICWA cases per month to two dozen cases in a 
matter of a few weeks.
58
 Besides an increase in ICWA cases, government 
services have been diminished as the number of overdoses continues to rise, 
further raising the fear that tribal membership will dwindle over the long 
term.
59
 The cornerstone of any tribe is the family unit, and as opioid use 
breaks families apart, tribal membership will suffer as a result. 
Along with its work across the United States, the Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) also works specifically 
with tribal governments to implement the five-point opioid strategy.
60
 The 
five-point strategy as it relates to tribes is:  
 “Improving access to prevention, treatment, and recovery support 
services.”
61
 SAMHSA accomplishes this by providing State 
Targeted Response to Opioids Crisis Grants through the 21st 
Century Cures Act.
62
 States can utilize these funds to pinpoint areas 
of the most need.
63
 
 “Targeting Overdose-Reversing Drugs.”64 SAMHSA has increased 
access to naloxone, an effective overdose reversing drug, and 
provides first responders and community leaders with access to the 
“Opioid Overdose Prevention Toolkit.”
65
 
 “Strengthening Public Health Data and Reporting.”66 SAMHSA 
administers the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) 
and provides the data collected to state and local officials.
67
 With 
                                                                                                             
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Opioids in Indian Country: Beyond the Crisis to Healing the Community: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 115th Cong. 10 (2018), https://www. 
indian.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CHRG-115shrg32784.pdf (testimony of 
Christopher Jones, Director, Nat’l Mental Health & Substance Use Pol’y Lab., Substance 
Abuse & Mental Health Serv. Admin.) [hereinafter Jones Testimony].  
 61. Id. at 13. 
 62. Id.; see Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016). 
 63. Jones Testimony, supra note 60, at 13. 
 64. Id. at 14. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. 
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this data, officials are able to better target high risk areas and 
populations in order to effectively and efficiently target resources.
68 
Through these resources, tribes have access to prevention programs, 
including the Strategic Prevention Framework-Partnerships for Success 
(SPF-PFS) grant program.
69
 Through the SPF-PFS grant, “First Nations 
Community HealthSource has developed prevention strategies based on 
research and tribal traditions” aiming to reduce prescription drug abuse, 
educate tribal leadership on prevention strategies, and cultivate “a tribal 
strengths-based method to decrease prescription drug abuse and misuse.”
70
 
Tribes also have access to grant money through the Opioid Response Grant 
Fund, with a tribal set aside of $50 million, and the Medication-Assisted 
Treatment for Prescription Drug and Opioid Abuse Program, with a tribal 
set aside of $5 million.
71
 These funds have given tribes the opportunity to 
begin combating prescription-opioid misuse; unfortunately, however, a new 
era in the opioid crisis has begun. While the federal government focuses its 
response to the crisis on prescription-opioid abuse and data collection, the 
third wave of the crisis—a shift from prescription opioids to illicitly-
manufactured fentanyl—is already underway.
72
 
Determined to protect its people from this threat, the Cherokee Nation, 
led by Attorney General Todd Hembree, began putting together the pieces 
of the plan in the fall of 2016.
73
 AG Hembree assembled a task force to 
build a case against the opioid industry.
74
 He learned that opioid 
manufacturers, although working as contractors for the IHS, were calling 
the shots when it came to prescription patterns in Indian Country.
75
 He also 
discovered that “opioid manufacturers, distributors and pharmacies had 
been operating virtually unchecked, paying relatively small fines for 
violating laws intended to stop large shipments and suspiciously high-
volume prescriptions.”
76
 Congress passed the Ensuring Patient Access and 
                                                                                                             
 68. Id. The remaining elements of the five-point strategy—“[s]upport cutting-edge 
research that advances our understanding of pain and addiction,” id. at 13, and “[a]dvance 
the practice of pain management to enable access to [effective] care,” id.—are not directly 
related to the response in Indian country. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Valenzuela, supra note 46. 
 72. Understanding the Epidemic, supra note 23. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See id. 
 76. Id. 
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Effective Drug Enforcement Act in 2016.
77
 AG Hembree believes that this 
legislation has made it easier for opiates to enter the country because it 
prevents the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) from stopping large or 
suspicious shipments of opioids entering the United States.
78
 Armed with 
this information, AG Hembree and the Cherokee Nation stood ready to be 
the “tip of the spear” in the battle against the opioid epidemic.
79
 Since the 
Nation filed suit in Cherokee Tribal Court in April 2017, hundreds of tribes 
and other communities have filed suits of their own.
80
 The action brought 
by the Cherokee Nation does not just stand to impact the lives of Cherokee 
members, but the suit also stands to impact the viability of other litigation 
across the country; the importance of McKesson Corp. v. Hembree cannot 
be understated. 
II. Statement of the Case: McKesson Corp. v. Hembree 
A. Facts 
The Center for Disease Control reports that over 300,000 Americans 
have died from opioid-involved drug overdoses;
81
 indeed, “[i]t is 
undisputed that this nation is in the midst of an opioid crisis.”
82
 Forty 
percent of the opioid deaths in America have involved a prescription 
opiate.
83
 The Cherokee Nation is particularly affected by the epidemic and, 
like many other states and tribal nations, planned to litigate against several 
defendants in the opioid industry.
84
 
In 2016, the Cherokee Nation Legislature enacted the Cherokee Nation 
Unfair and Deceptive Practices Act (CNUDPA).
85
 The CNUDPA, part of 
the Comprehensive Access to Justice Act (CAJA) of 2016, amended the 
Cherokee Nation Civil Procedure Rules, allowing the Cherokee Nation to 
                                                                                                             
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.; “Plaintiffs [cities, counties, or states] in 46 actions move[d] under 28 U.S.C § 
1407 to centralize pretrial proceedings . . . pending in nine districts.” In re Nat'l Prescription 
Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375, 1376–77 (J.P.M.L. 2017). 
 81. Id. 
 82. McKesson Corp. v. Hembree, No. 17-CV-323-TCK-FHM, 2018 WL 340042, at *1 
(N.D. Okla. Jan. 9, 2018). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Comprehensive Access to Justice Act, CHEROKEE NATION CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 21–
28 (2016). 
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file a civil lawsuit against opioid defendants as parens patriae.
86
 In parens 
patriae actions, “states seek ‘to protect or vindicate the state’s “quasi-
sovereign” interests in the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.’”
87
 
States have used the parens patriae principle successfully in other 
instances, including recovering costs incurred as a result of tobacco use by 
citizens.
88
 As a result of the tobacco litigation, forty-six states settled with 
four tobacco companies in 1998.
89
 The tobacco industry was able to defend 
against individual lawsuits by asserting that the “smoker was aware of the 
risks and decided to smoke anyway.” This defense was unsuccessful against 
the states as parens patriae.
90
 AG Hembree planned to use the same 
strategy for litigation in tribal court and hoped that, as a sovereign 
government, the Cherokee Nation would obtain similar results as the states 
in the tobacco litigation.  
B. Procedural History 
The Cherokee Nation filed suit in Cherokee District Court, naming six 
pharmaceutical companies as defendants: CVS, Walgreens, and Wal-Mart 
(Pharmacies); and McKesson, Cardinal Health, and AmerisourceBergen 
(Distributors).
91
 The Nation "assert[ed] claims under CNUDPA and 
common law claims for nuisance, negligence, unjust enrichment, and civil 
conspiracy," alleging the pharmaceutical defendants “knowingly or 
negligently distributed and dispensed prescription opioid drugs within the 
Cherokee Nation in a manner that foreseeably injured . . . the Cherokee 
Nation and its citizens.”
92
 The common law claims sought “injunctive 




The pharmaceutical companies filed an action challenging the tribal 
court’s jurisdiction in the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Oklahoma against AG Hembree, Judge Crystal R. Jackson, 
                                                                                                             
 86. McKesson, 2018 WL 340042, at *1; see Robert C. Batson, Addressing the Opioid 
Crisis in Indian Country with A Parens Patriae Action in Tribal Court, 11 ALB. GOV'T L. 
REV. 106, 116 (2018). 
 87. Batson, supra note 86, at 107. 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 108. 
 91. McKesson, 2018 WL 340042, at *2 (citing Cherokee Nation v. McKesson Corp. et 
al., No. CV-2017-203 (Cherokee Nation D. Ct. filed Apr. 20, 2017)). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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Judge T. Luke Barteaux, and Doe Judicial Officers 1-4.
94
 The 
pharmaceutical companies sought a declaratory judgment that the Nation 
lacked jurisdiction in tribal court. They also sought a preliminary injunction 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 to enjoin the Nation from 




Before addressing the primary issues in front of it, the court established 
the standard for preliminary injunction,
96
 then found that the tribal court's 
lack of jurisdiction over the claims was "clear," holding that the 
pharmaceutical companies met all the elements to warrant preliminary 
injunction as to both the CNUPDA and common law claims.
97
 The 
companies were also able to show they did not need to exhaust tribal court 
remedies before challenging the tribal court’s jurisdiction.
98
 
The court then addressed whether the pharmaceutical companies were 
likely to succeed in their challenge of tribal jurisdiction. Success on the 
merits in this case called for application of the tribal court jurisdictional rule 
set forth in Montana v. United States. The Montana rule is subject to two 
exceptions; the burden to prove one of the exceptions applies falls on the 
party seeking to assert tribal jurisdiction—here, the Cherokee Nation.
99
 
Those two exceptions are as follows. First, “[a] tribe may regulate, through 
taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter 
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial 
dealings, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.”
100
 Second, “[a] tribe 
may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct 
                                                                                                             
 94. Id. The court indicates in footnote 2 that although the tribal parties asserted in 
response to the companies’ complaint that only Judge Barteaux is assigned to hear the case 
in tribal court, because Judge Jackson failed to file a motion seeking to be dismissed 
pursuant to the local rules, she must remain a party to the action. Id. at *2 n.2. 
 95. Id. at *2. 
 96. Id. The court identified that the burden falls on the plaintiff to show that: (1) they 
are likely to succeed on the merits of the claim; (2) they will undergo irreparable injury 
without the injunction; (3) the threatened injury against the plaintiff would be greater 
without the injunction than the defendants with it; (4) the injunction would not negatively 
affect the public interest. Id. (citing N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish v. U.S. Dep’t of the 
Interior, 854 F.3d 1236, 1246 (10th Cir. 2017)). 
 97. Id. at *5, *9–11. 
 98. Id. at *5.  
 99. McKesson, 2018 WL 340042, at *3 (citing Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family 
Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 330 (2008). 
 100. Id. at *3 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981)). 
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of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct 
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic 
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”
101
 
In order for the pharmaceutical companies to “avoid exhaustion [they] 
must ‘make a substantial showing of eligibility’ that one of the exceptions 
[to the exhaustion rule] applies.”
102
 Those exceptions are: “(1) where an 
assertion of tribal jurisdiction is motivated by a desire to harass or is 
conducted in bad faith; (2) where the action is patently violative of express 
jurisdictional prohibitions; . . . (3) where exhaustion would be futile 
because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the court's 
jurisdiction; [and] (4) where it is clear that the tribal court lacks jurisdiction 
and that judicial proceedings would serve no purpose other than delay.”
103
 
The companies contended that the CNUDPA was an inappropriate 
attempt to enforce the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), and as such, tribal 
jurisdiction over the claim was automatically foreclosed; the court 
agreed.
104
 The Cherokee Nation's enforcement was found to be private 
because "unlike states, tribes do not have courts of general jurisdiction."
105
 
Additionally, the court found that because the companies are nonmembers, 
and it is well established that the CSA may not be privately enforced,
 106
 




After denying the CNUDPA claims, the court found that the common 
law claims fell outside of both Montana exceptions, denying the tribal court 
jurisdiction over the claims as well.
108
 Further, it explained that any 
relationship between the Cherokee Nation and the companies was 
sufficiently limited to prevent tribal court jurisdiction over the conduct.
109
 
Citing only the companies’ evidence, the court explained that the 
relationship was separated by third parties, keeping any transactions at 
                                                                                                             
 101. Id. (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566). 
 102. Id. at *4 (quoting Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Farley, 115 F.3d 1489, 1502 (10th Cir. 
2011)). 
 103. Id. (quoting Thlopthlocco Tribal Town v. Stidham, 762 F.3d 1226, 1238 (10th Cir. 
2014)). 
 104. Id. at *5. 
 105. Id. (citation omitted). 
 106. Id. (citing Jones v. Hobbs, 745 F. Supp. 2d 886, 890–94 (E.D. Ark. 2010); Hatfield 
v. Arbor Springs Health & Rehab Center, No. 3-12CV528-MHT, 2012 WL 4476612, at *3 
(M.D. Ala. Sept. 4, 2012)).  
 107. Id. (quoting Thlopthlocco Tribal Town, 762 F.3d at 1239). 
 108. Id. at *6–9. 
 109. Id. at *6. 
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 In conclusion, because there is no apparent nexus between 
the claims made and any consensual relationship, the court held that the 




The district court’s decision in McKesson is a far cry from where federal 
Indian policy stood almost 200 years ago. In the case of Worcester v. 
Georgia, the Supreme Court set the relationship between the states and 
tribes as one of “political independence.”
112
 In McKesson, the court’s 
decision that the CNUPDA was a private enforcement of the CSA is 
illustrative of how differently the court views tribes from state or even local 
governments. The court found fault in the Cherokee Nation’s use of the 
CSA as advisory in the passage of its own laws.
113
 The court analyzed the 
issue as though the federal government is far superior to the Tribe. AG 
Hembree asserted in response that the Tribe can utilize the CSA in its 
legislation the same way that a state can because the statue expressly denies 
field preemption over a state’s ability to regulate controlled substances.
114
 
However, the district court denied this claim because the tribal court lacked 
general jurisdiction. 
In McKesson, the court analyzed the Montana rule to determine whether 
tribal court jurisdiction was appropriate in the case. The court held that the 
first Montana exception did not apply.
115
 It relied on evidence provided by 
the companies in the case that indicated the relationship was “simply 
routine business or consumer transactions.”
116
 The argument certainly exists 
that the court unfairly favored the companies’ evidence without considering 
the factual dispute arising from the evidence presented by AG Hembree—in 
particular, the service of the Cherokee Nation Health Plan by the 
                                                                                                             
 110. Id. (“This evidence indicates that at most, any relationship[] between Plaintiffs and 
the Cherokee Nation or its members [is] simply routine business or consumer transactions.”). 
The court goes on to provide several cases that applied the first Montana exception. Id. at *7 
(citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 233 (1959); Cardin v. De La Cruz, 671 F.2d 363, 
366–67 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
 111. Id. at *7. 
 112. James A. Casey, Note, Sovereignty by Sufferance: The Illusion of Indian Tribal 
Sovereignty, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 404, 410–11 (1994). 
 113. McKesson, 2018 WL 340042, at *5 (“However, courts have rejected private 
attempts to enforce the CSA through other vehicles.”). 
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. at *6–7. 
 116. Id. at *6. 
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 The Cherokee Nation Health Plan is the largest tribally 
operated health care system in the United States.
118
 Administering the 
prescription drug program for the health plan, even through a third-party 
contract, should constitute an intentional relationship to satisfy the Montana 
exception. 
The court’s rejection of the second Montana exception is more 
questionable than the first. Even though the exception “is a narrow one,” 
the refusal to allow AG Hembree to even present any evidence to a jury of 
whether the Plaintiffs’ conduct “imperil[ed] the subsistence of the tribal 
community[]” limited the capacity of the Cherokee Nation to protect its 
citizens.
119
 The court diminished the evidence of the harm caused by the 
opioid crisis to the Cherokee Nation; this treatment of the Tribe is 
emblematic of the larger problem of the federal-tribal relationship. The 
safety and well-being of tribes and tribal members has always been 
secondary to the maintenance of the power structure of the federal 
government. The difference between this case and jurisdictional battles 
between tribes and federal or state governments is that here the court 
willfully ignored the evidence of serious harm, choosing instead to protect 
the interests of a group of some of the world’s largest corporations. 
The second Montana exception is narrow, applying to “situations where 
the conduct of the nonmember poses a direct threat to tribal sovereignty.”
120
 
Indeed, “[t]he nonmember’s conduct must be ‘catastrophic for tribal self-
government.’”
121
 The court distinguished two cases put forward by the 
Tribe and found that, despite the significant harm that has been caused to 
the Cherokee Nation by the opioid epidemic, the conduct alleged did not 
reach the level required to grant tribal jurisdiction.
122
  
The court declined to apply exhaustion to the common law claims either, 
finding that the companies are nonmembers and the defendants failed to 
make a legitimate argument that either Montana exception applied.
123
 In 
conclusion, the court found that the companies were likely to succeed on 
                                                                                                             
 117. Id. 
 118. About Health Services, CHEROKEE NATION, https://www.cherokee.org/Services/ 
Health/About-Health-Services (last visited Mar. 5, 2019). 
 119. McKesson, 2018 WL 340042, at *7. 
 120. Id. at *8 (quoting Phillip Morris USA, Inc. v. King Mountain Tobacco Co., 569 F. 
3d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
 121. Id. (quoting Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 
316, 341 (2008)). 
 122. Id. at *9. It appears that the court did not analyze the plaintiffs’ evidence as to the 
second Montana exception and provided no affirmative justification for its decision. 
 123. Id. 
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In determining whether to issue an injunction against the tribal court, the 
court looked to whether the companies would suffer irreparable injury 
absent an injunction. The court appeared to discount promises made by the 
Tribe that would have prevented the very harm that it deemed necessitated 
an injunction.
125
 Even though the tribe had agreed to honor any 
requirements put upon it by the federal court, because the tribe failed to 
waive sovereign immunity, the court determined that the companies may 
face irreparable harm.
126
 This notion comes despite an order from the 
Cherokee Nation District Court that stated “the defendants in that case (the 
Plaintiffs here) ‘shall not be required to post any appeal or supersedeas 
bond’ . . . and ‘may seek a stay of execution of any judgment of this Court 
pending appeal without the posting of a supersedeas bond.”
127
 Despite the 
tribal court order, as well as a concession from the Tribe that it would honor 
any additional protections imposed by the federal court, the court found that 
irreparable harm “is both great and non-speculative” due to the “plain terms 
of its own law.”
128
 
Next, the discussion moved to whether the Tribes’ risk of injury without 
the injunction outweighed the Companies’ risk of injury with the 
injunction.
129
 The court disposed of this issue by finding that the Tribe 
could assert its claims in another forum; thus, injury was unlikely.
130
 
Accordingly, the risk of injury to the companies outweighed the risk to the 
Tribe. Finally, the court determined that the injunction would not adversely 
impact the public interest.
131
 Because the tribal court clearly lacked 
jurisdiction, public interest was not served to allow the tribal court to make 
findings on the matter.
132
 
The opioid crisis continues to ravage Indian Country, but the court at no 
point acknowledged the damage being done to the Cherokee Nation and its 
                                                                                                             
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at *10. 
 126. Id. (“Due to tribal sovereign immunity, Plaintiffs may be unable to sue the Cherokee 
Nation for return of the bond funds even if a federal court later found that the tribal court 
lacked jurisdiction.”). 
 127. Id. (quoting Notice of Entry of Tribal Court Ordinance on Bond Issue, Doc. 130, at 
2).  
 128. Id. at *10, *11. 
 129. Id. at *11. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
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citizens. Instead, the court held that the Tribe was more risk averse than the 
companies because “the Cherokee Nation could assert claims to redress any 
injury in another, non-tribal forum.”
133
 
The potential injury to the companies acknowledged by the court refers 
to the Cherokee Nation’s failure to waive sovereign immunity with regards 
to a bond that the companies would have to post on appeal of the tribal 
court ruling.
134
 This justification is faulty in two ways. First, it presumes 
that the tribal court would indeed find for the Tribe in the case. While that 
is certainly a highly likely outcome, to base a decision of this magnitude on 
an assumption of that nature is equally irregular and inappropriate.  
Second, it ignores both an order from the tribal court that the companies 
would not be required to post such a bond and a statement by AG Hembree 
that he would agree with any other protections recommended by the district 
court. To flatly ignore these good faith efforts and then claim that the 
“scenario is premised not on an assumption of bad faith by the Cherokee 
Nation” is a gravely misguided interpretation of the case.
135
 The Cherokee 
Nation wanted to defend its citizens in a forum it knows will be fair to the 
Tribe. Throughout history, both state and federal courts have been unkind 
to tribes.
136
 Tribal courts are a means of leveling the playing field between 
tribal plaintiffs and non-Indian defendants. To suggest that a tribe can 
simply make its claim in another forum, either state or federal, comes 
dangerously close to the language used in the assimilation era that caused 
great harm to Indians.
137
 Additionally, as this comment will discuss in Part 
IV, the Cherokee Nation would lose its choice of forum altogether. 
E. Discussion 
The opioid crisis has harmed Native Americans in more catastrophic 
ways than any other group in America. This harm can be directly attributed 
to the long history of the federal-tribal relationship and the disruptive 
policies of the United States government. The very survival of tribal 
governance is at stake in this case; it is imperative that the Cherokee Nation 
be allowed to see this matter through in tribal court. It is important to 
understand the backdrop against which the district court in McKesson was 
working from in order to evaluate its decision. It is equally important to 
                                                                                                             
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at *10. 
 135. Id.  
 136. See Sharon O'Brien, Tribes and Indians: With Whom Does the United States 
Maintain A Relationship?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1461, 1465–66 (1991). 
 137. See id. 
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understand the historical context of federal Indian law to best analyze and 
critique the district court’s opinion. The analysis will assert that these 
decisions gradually diminished the status of Indian tribes from that of a 
state to that of a local government. This historical context shaped the way 
the Montana decision is applied and as a result, Montana is too often used 
to rule against tribal sovereignty. Accordingly, the district court should 
have applied the exhaustion doctrine so that the tribal court could fulfill its 
duty to protect its citizens. The Supreme Court in the case of National 
Farmers Union Insurance Companies v. Crow Tribe of Indians created the 
exhaustion doctrine so that tribal courts could assess their own jurisdiction 
in civil cases before a federal court can review any jurisdictional issue.
138
 
The Court justified its decision in part because a fully developed record 
from the tribal court would serve “the orderly administration of justice in 
the federal court,” and in order for that record to be developed, the federal 
courts should “stay[] its hand” until the tribal courts have the opportunity to 
“exhaust” their own remedies.
139
 This decision created the exhaustion 
doctrine, which made it a requirement for tribal courts to fully determine 
their own jurisdiction before a federal court can review a claim that the 
tribal court exceeded its authority. The district court in McKesson should 
have applied the exhaustion doctrine, if for no other reason to serve “the 
orderly administration of justice in federal court[.]”
140
 The stakes were too 
high in this case to continue down the path toward destruction of tribal 
jurisdiction.  
1. Tribal Jurisdiction and the Incoherence of Supreme Court 
Jurisprudence; Or, There and Back Again 
The Supreme Court’s failure to establish cogent jurisprudence in its 
tribal court jurisdiction decisions has weakened the notion of tribal 
jurisdiction.
141
 The Court’s jurisprudence has wavered between respect for 
tribal courts and assertions of “judicial plenary power.”
142
 These waves 
have given lower courts space to exercise discretion in a manner that limits 
tribal jurisdiction in significant ways.  
                                                                                                             
 138. 471 U.S. 845 (1985). 
 139. Id. at 856–57. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Frank Pommersheim, "Our Federalism" in the Context of Federal Courts and Tribal 
Courts: An Open Letter to the Federal Courts' Teaching and Scholarly Community, 71 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 123, 129 (2000). 
 142. Id. at 128. 
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In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the Court diminished tribal 
courts’ criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes on tribal 
land.
143
 The petitioners in the case were arraigned in Suquamish Indian 
Provisional Court on criminal charges; they filed writs of habeas corpus in 
the United States Western District of Washington, claiming the tribal court 
did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
144
 In response to the 
writ, the Tribe acknowledged that Congress or a treaty had not granted 
specific authorization, but asserted that “such jurisdiction flows 
automatically from the Tribe’s retained inherent powers of government 
over the Port Madison Indian Reservation.”
145
 While the district court found 
for the petitioners, the Ninth Circuit reversed in favor of the Tribe, after 
which the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
146
 
In its opinion, the Supreme Court made clear that, absent authorization 
by Congress, the Tribe does not have inherent authority over non-
Indians.
147
 The Court found that the assertion of any non-delegated 
jurisdiction by the tribal court contradicts subordination of the tribes to the 
United States government.
148
 The reasoning of the Court is cyclical: Indian 
tribes have no inherent jurisdiction over non-Indians within the borders of 
their reservations because they forfeited full sovereignty in exchange for the 
protection of the United States. The tribes, however, only needed the 
protection of the United States because of the destruction of tribal 
governments by the United States government. In this way, the United 
States created the conditions under which the tribes were practically forced 
to forfeit that sovereignty. The Court also relies on the fact that the “Indians 
are within the geographical limits of the United States,” and as such, “[t]he 
soil and people within these limits are under the political control of the 
Government of the United States . . . .”
149
 This reasoning further diminished 
the tribes from being equivalent to the states, making them more akin to 
“cities, counties, and other organized bodies with limited legislative 
functions.”
150
 Oliphant was the first in a series of Supreme Court decisions 
that would diminish tribal jurisdiction. 
                                                                                                             
 143. 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 196 (internal quotation omitted). 
 146. Id. at 195. 
 147. Id. at 211. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id.  
 150. Id. 
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While the case of United States v. Lara seemed to overrule Oliphant,
151
 
the reasoning in Oliphant would survive even if it produced contradictory 
results as related to the parties. The petitioner in Lara was a nonmember 
Indian who was expelled from the Spirit Lake Reservation for numerous 
instances of wrongdoing; he ignored the order, and when apprehended by 
federal officials, he struck and injured one of the officers.
152
 The petitioner 
was convicted in Spirit Lake Tribal Court for “violence to a policeman” and 
was also charged in the Federal District Court for the District Court of 
North Dakota for a corresponding federal crime.
153
 The petitioner 
challenged the federal charge by claiming that he was protected by the 
double jeopardy clause.
154
 To this claim, the government responded that 
because the prosecutions were brought by separate sovereigns, double 
jeopardy protection was precluded.
155
 
The Court’s opinion did not reject the reasoning that it utilized in 
Oliphant. Rather, the Court recognized that when Congress passed 25 
U.S.C. § 1301(2),
156
 it “enlarge[d] the tribes’ own powers of self-
government to include the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby 
recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians, 
including nonmembers.”
157
 The Court held that because Congress intended 
to give “inherent tribal sovereignty” rather than “delegated federal 
authority” to prosecute Indians to the tribes, dual sovereignty applied, 
which would preclude the petitioner’s double jeopardy claim.
158
 The Court 
went on to explain that Congress had the authority to delegate such 
                                                                                                             
 151. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196 (2004). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 196–97. 
 154. U.S. CONST. amend. V. (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”). 
 155. Lara, 541 U.S. at 197 (describing the holding in Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 
(1985)) (“[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause reflects the ‘common-law conception of crime as 
an offense against the sovereignty of the government’; when ‘a defendant in a single act 
violates the “peace and dignity” of two sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, he has 
committed two distinct “offences”’ . . . .”). 
 156. The section states in full: 
“[P]owers of self-government” means and includes all governmental powers 
possessed by an Indian tribe, executive, legislative, and judicial, and all offices, 
bodies, and tribunals by and through which they are executed, including courts 
of Indian offenses; and means the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby 
recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians. 
25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2018). 
 157. Lara, 541 U.S. at 198 (internal quotations and emphasis omitted).  
 158. Id. at 199.  
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“inherent sovereignty,” and that the opinion in Lara was consistent with its 
other opinions that found the authority to prosecute nonmembers had been 




While the Court in Lara appeared to err on the side of self-determination 
by Indian Tribes, the Court did not go far enough to insulate its decision 
from future intervention by either the Court or Congress. The Court used 
shaky logic, at best, to uphold Congress’s authority to legislatively give 
tribes inherent power of self-determination. For a power to be inherent in 
something, the thing must exist in and of its self in order for the power to 
exist at all; if Congress has the discretion to take away and then give back 
the tribe’s jurisdictional authority, it is hardly an inherent power. Rather, it 
is a power that the tribes hold at the behest of Congress. Thus, if the Court’s 
first holding—that criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians is an 
inherent tribal power—then the second holding—that Congress can 
legislatively change tribal jurisdiction—cannot stand. The Supreme Court’s 
unwillingness to put its foot down when it comes to the inherent 
sovereignty of Indian tribes in Oliphant and Lara has played a major role in 
the continued diminishment of tribal jurisdiction. A tribe’s authority over 
criminal matters that occur against its citizens or within its territories is 
perhaps the most fundamental to the protection of the health and safety of 
tribal citizens. If the Supreme Court was willing to so easily limit that 
authority as they did in Oliphant and Lara, they wouldn’t blink twice to do 
the same to civil jurisdiction.  
The holding in Montana v. United States
160
 attempted to reign in the 
meandering jurisprudence in the field of federal Indian law. however, it 
actually placed significant discretion within the federal court system to 
determine when tribal court jurisdiction is appropriate. Similar to Lara, 
while Montana, though operating in the civil context, again attempted to 
give tribal courts more opportunities to assert jurisdiction, it actually further 
limited the “inherent” sovereignty vested in the tribes.  
Montana involved a challenge by the State of Montana against the Crow 
Tribe of Montana’s power to limit hunting and fishing by nonmembers on 
non-Indian property within reservation boundaries.
161
 The dispute centered 
around two issues: first, the ownership of the banks and bed of the Big 
                                                                                                             
 159. Id. at 205 (distinguishing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978); 
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Horn River; second, whether the Tribe’s inherent sovereignty gave it the 
authority to regulate and/or prohibit the activity in question.
162
 The United 
States, acting on behalf of the Tribe, claimed that the government 
“conveyed beneficial ownership of the riverbed to the Crow Tribe by the 
treaties of 1851 or 1868, and therefore continues to hold the land in trust for 
the use and benefit of the Tribe.”
163
 Montana claimed that the United States 
did not hold the land in trust by treaty, but it rather “retained ownership of 
the riverbed as public land which then passed to the State of Montana upon 
its admission to the Union.”
164
 The Court held that the United States 
presumptively maintains the title to the riverbed under any navigable river, 
regardless of whether the government conveys the land surrounding and 
including the river.
165
 Thus, the Court found that the riverbed land is held in 
trust by the government for future states “when they enter the Union and 
assume sovereignty on an equal footing with the established States.”
166
 
Because the ownership of navigable riverbeds is “so strongly identified 
with the sovereign power of government,” any transfer to an entity other 
than a future state can only be completed to fulfill “some international duty 
or public exigency.”
167
 The Court held that the treaties between the Crow 
Tribe and the United States were insufficient to overcome the 
presumption.
168
 Thus, the United States retained the land in trust until it was 
conveyed to the State of Montana.
169
 In deciding this issue, the Court 
developed a balancing test to determine whether it would be prudent for the 
Tribe to assert jurisdiction in the matter. 
Courts often use the Montana test to justify decisions that although 
perhaps not expressly intentional, ultimately disfavor tribal jurisdiction. The 
Montana test attempts to allow for more nuanced decisions regarding tribal 
jurisdiction. This approach does not support the Court’s decisions in Lara, 
above, and National Farmers Union Insurance Companies v. Crow Tribe of 
Indians, below, which stand for the principle that tribal sovereignty is 
inherent. If the Court wanted to uphold the principle that tribal sovereignty 
is inherent, then nuance is the last thing the Court should bring into the fold. 
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 165. Id. at 555. 
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National Farmers Union Insurance Companies v. Crow Tribe of Indians 
demonstrates the Court’s intent to support tribal court jurisdiction.
171
 The 
case involved a suit in Crow Tribal Court filed by a member of the Tribe 
against a non-Indian.
172
 The defendant’s insurance provider filed suit in the 
District Court of Montana, asserting a lack of jurisdiction by the tribal 
court.
173
 The district court sided with the defendant and entered an 
injunction to prevent further action in the tribal court.
174
  
On appeal, the appellate court reversed the injunction, holding that the 
District Court of Montana did not have jurisdiction to order the injunction, 
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if the district court 
had jurisdiction over the request pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
175
 Justice 
Stevens wrote for the Court and held that because the issue involved a 
federal question, the district court properly asserted jurisdiction.
176
 “[T]he 
question [of] whether a tribal court has the power to exercise civil subject-
matter jurisdiction over non-Indians . . . should [be examined] in the first 
instance in the Tribal Court itself.”
177
 The Court refused to apply the 
reasoning from Oliphant and expressed a desire to develop a doctrine that 




The case of Strate v. A-1 Contractors involved a jurisdictional question 
regarding a traffic accident that occurred on a North Dakota state highway 
running through the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation.
179
 The action was 
originally brought in tribal court against one of the drivers and his employer 
for damages sustained during the accident.
180
 Neither the plaintiff, 
                                                                                                             
 170. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE 
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 171. 471 U.S. 845, 847 (1985). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
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 177. Id. at 855–56. 
 178. Id. at 856. 
 179. See 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997). 
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defendant, or defendant’s employer were members of the Tribe.
181
 The 
respondents made appearances in tribal court to challenge the tribal court’s 
personal and subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter.
182
 The respondents 
sought an injunction in the district court, where the court found the tribal 
court had jurisdiction based on the decision in National Farmers Union 
Insurance Companies v. Crow Tribe of Indians.
183
 The Eighth Circuit 
affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
184
  
In its analysis, the Court attempted to explain the recent history of Indian 
law jurisprudence at the Supreme Court. The Court held that the decision in 
National Farmers does not make the jurisdictional analysis in Montana 
inapplicable and that the rule in National Farmers is nothing “more than a 
prudential exhaustion rule, in deference to the capacity of tribal courts to 
explain to the parties the precise basis for accepting or rejecting 
jurisdiction.”
185
 This decision contradicts the language in National 
Farmers, which states that “exhaustion is required before such a claim may 
be entertained in a federal court.”
186
 National Farmers explicitly required 
exhaustion in federal court. The Court in Strate did not overrule the 
exhaustion doctrine in National Farmers, but held the rule is less stringent 
than what the language in National Farmers required. The Court instead 
used the Montana rule, finding that tribal jurisdiction over the matter was 
not “necessary to protect tribal self-government.”
187
  
The Supreme Court has wavered between decisions that support tribal 
jurisdiction, decisions that outwardly support tribal jurisdiction but 
inwardly work to limit it, and decisions that on their face cause damage to 
tribal jurisdiction. This wavering has created a body of federal case law that 
has limited tribal jurisdiction. While the Supreme Court consistently alludes 
to tribes’ “inherent sovereignty,” it nevertheless continues to rule in ways to 
diminish that authority. For a power to be inherent, it must be so vital to the 
tribes that they would fail to exist without it. McKesson is a perfect example 
of a case where the Montana rule and the Strate prudential exhaustion rule 
have combined to threaten not only tribal sovereignty, but an Indian tribe’s 
very way of life. These rules have narrowed the window through which a 
                                                                                                             
 181. Id.  
 182. Id. at 444. 
 183. Id. at 444–45 (citing Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 
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 185. Id. at 450 (Internal quotations omitted). 
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federal court may view tribal jurisdiction. That window is now so small that 
a public health crisis—which gave cause for a presidential emergency 
declaration—is not enough to trigger Montana’s second exception. The 
court in Mckesson should have required the opioid defendants to exhaust 
their remedies in tribal court. Not only is that the “prudential” decision, 
Tenth Circuit precedent also indicates that it is the correct course of action. 
Doing so is the only way to both promote the inherent sovereignty of the 
Cherokee Nation and protect its way of life from the opioid crisis. 
2. The Role of the Exhaustion Doctrine 
The opioid crisis represents such a grave threat to tribal self-
governance—and the tribal way of life—that the only legitimate option to 
prevent severe damage to those interests is to apply the exhaustion 
doctrine.
188
 The opioid crisis has caused the overdose rate among Indians to 
increase by 500 percent in the last decade. That increase is the highest 
among racial groups in the United States. For the district court to claim that 
“[a]ny potential injury to the Cherokee Nation does not outweigh the 
certain and great injury to Plaintiffs if the Court does not enjoin the Tribal 
Court Action” is to ignore the fact that over 120,000 tribal members are 
misusing opiates.
189
 The district court’s failure to realize the gravity of the 
situation facing the Cherokee Nation illustrates how the exhaustion doctrine 
can be effective in balancing the Tribe’s wish to assert sovereignty with the 
federal courts interest in “orderly administration of justice.”
190
 
Additionally, without the benefit of a record from the tribal court, the 
district court had a limited set of facts upon which to make its decision. The 
opinion in McKesson is decidedly void of any substantive factual 
justifications for its decision.
191
 Had the district court stayed its decision 
until the tribal remedies were exhausted, the record upon de novo review of 
the tribal court’s “construction of jurisdictional limitations” would have 
been far more robust than the review for preliminary injunction.
192
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Another reason to apply the exhaustion doctrine is to provide consistency 
surrounding issues of tribal jurisdiction.
193
 Following National Farmers, 
federal district courts and federal circuit courts began to formalize their 
processes when reviewing tribal jurisdiction.
194
 The decision in Strate 
destroyed that consistency, which has created a lack of trust in the judicial 
system. 
Although the Supreme Court in Strate sharply limited the reach of the 
exhaustion doctrine by making it prudential, it plainly left the doctrine 
intact. In fact, the Court acknowledged that the two exceptions in Montana 
still apply.
195
 The district court in McKesson still had the option to decide 
that the exhaustion doctrine was appropriate. Indeed, when the Supreme 
Court stated that it “[did] not extract from National Farmers anything more 
than a prudential exhaustion rule,” it still expected lower courts to consider 
exhaustion.
196
 The Court indicated that exhaustion is a way to ensure that 
the reviewing court has a full record to serve “the orderly administration of 
justice,” to avoid “procedural nightmare[s],” to “encourage tribal courts to 
explain to the parties the precise basis for accepting jurisdiction,” and to 
“provide other courts with the benefit of their expertise in such matters.”
197
 
The Tenth Circuit case of Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Farley illustrates how 
Strate did not eliminate the exhaustion doctrine requirement on all tribal 
jurisdiction matters, but rather was a narrow ruling pertaining to a particular 
fact scenario.
198
 In Kerr-McGee Corp., the Tenth Circuit stated that the 
Supreme Court in Strate was not seeking to “identify an express 
jurisdictional prohibition, but rather was in the position to address whether 
tribal adjudicatory power remains over civil disputes involving 
nonmembers on state highways within the reservation.”
199
 Thus, Strate did 
not apply because the federal plaintiffs had already exhausted their 
remedies in tribal court, where the plaintiffs in Kerr-McGee Corp. had not.  
The Tenth Circuit went on to review the comity concerns for tribal 
sovereignty and applied the exhaustion rule.
200
 It found that “absent 
overwhelming countervailing concerns[]” tribal courts should be allowed to 
                                                                                                             
 193. Id. at 307. 
 194. Id.  
 195. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997). 
 196. Id. at 450. 
 197. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Companies v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 
(1985). 
 198. 115 F.3d 1498, 1507 (1997). 
 199. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 200. Id. at 1509. 
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try cases that are within their jurisdiction and allege injury to tribal 
members.
201
 The Cherokee Nation has satisfied these requirements in 
McKesson. The court in McKesson should have ruled in favor of allowing 
the tribal court to decide if the issues alleged by the Cherokee Nation 
allowed for tribal jurisdiction. “Even Strate and Montana, cases that 
curtailed tribal authority over non-Indians, recognized that tribes retain a 
core sovereign interest in protecting the health and welfare of the 
tribe . . . .”
202
 
III. Statement of the Case: In re National 
Prescription Opiate Litigation 
A. Procedural History 
Following its defeat in federal court, the Cherokee Nation filed similar 
litigation in the District Court of Sequoyah County, Oklahoma.
203
 In this 
action, the Cherokee Nation asserted only state law claims against the 
opioid defendants in response to the same factual scenario as McKesson.
204
 
With the number of potential actions against common opioid defendants 
increasing, plaintiffs in forty-six federal actions moved the Judicial Panel 
on Multidistrict Litigation to centralize the pretrial proceedings in sixty-
four actions across nine districts.
205
 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, actions 
involving common questions of fact that are pending in different federal 
districts may be combined. These claims will be assigned to a judge or 
judges by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.
206
 In this case, the 
multidistrict litigation (MDL) was assigned to the Federal District Court for 
the Northern District of Ohio. 
 Following the creation of the MDL, opioid defendant McKesson 
removed the Oklahoma state case to the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Oklahoma pursuant to the Federal Officer Removal 
Statute.
207
 The motion was considered in the Federal District Court for the 
Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, due to the MDL. 
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B. Opinion  
1. Issue Framing/Holding 
The district court established that when applying the federal officer 
removal statute, it is free to use its own circuit’s precedent.
208
 As a result, 
the court applied Sixth Circuit precedent to the Cherokee Nation case.
209
 
“[T]he Sixth Circuit has endorsed ‘the broad scope of the federal officer 
removal statute’ . . . .”
210
 In order to determine whether or not removal 
applies to a private corporate defendant, the defendant must show that “(1) 
it is a person who acted under the direction of a federal officer; (2) the 
actions for which it is being sued were performed under the color of federal 
office, and (3) there is a colorable federal defense to the plaintiff’s 
claims.”
211
 The court held that even though this case was a "close call," the 
facts asserted by the McKesson were sufficient to meet the “liberal 





The first step for the court was to find that McKesson was “acting under” 
a federal officer because of their contract with the Veterans Administration 
(VA).
213
 Private contractors are said to be acting under a federal officer 
when the contractor “is helping the Government to produce an item that it 
needs, [and] in the absence of a contract with a private firm, the 
Government itself would have had to perform [the contracted job].”
214
 In 
this case, the district court agreed with McKesson that their contract with 
the VA represented an “unusually close relationship . . . due to monitoring 
and oversight of the PPV Contract by a Contracting Officer.”
215
 Were it not 
for the contract with McKesson, the court explained that the VA would 
have had to handle the distribution and storage of drugs itself.
216
 As a result, 
                                                                                                             
 208. Id. (citing In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 
1186 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).  
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 1069 (quoting Bennett v. MIS Corp., 607 F.3d 1076, 1084 (6th Cir. 2010)). 
 211. Id. (citing Bennett, 607 F.3d at 1085). 
 212. Id. at 1076.  
 213. Id. at 1071–72.  
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 215. Id. at 1071. 
 216. Id. at 1076.  
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McKesson was acting under a federal officer for purposes of the federal 
officer removal statute.  
The next consideration was whether McKesson was acting under the 
“color of federal office”; according to the District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio, Eastern Division, the conduct for which the McKesson 
was being sued indeed occurred under color of federal office.
217
 This 
element requires a “causal nexus” between the claims and conduct out of 
which the action arises.
218
 The court found that the Tribal plaintiff’s claims 
“put all prescription opioids at issue . . . including those opioids supplied 
pursuant to the PPV contract.”
219
  
Finally, the court found that McKesson asserted a colorable federal 
defense.
220
 The court agreed with McKesson that the “government 
contractor defense” is a plausible federal defense.
221
 The court also 
discussed some of the potential policy issues with removing the case to 
federal court. It dismissed the tribal plaintiff’s argument that removal in the 
instant case would allow McKesson to seek removal of cases brought by 
state attorney generals.
222
 The court reasoned that because neither 
McKesson or any of the other opioid defendants removed any state cases 





To justify its decision that McKesson “acted under the direction of a 
federal officer,” the court focused on some of the details of the 
pharmaceutical prime vendor (PPV) Contract between McKesson and the 
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VA, as well as the Indian Health Service (IHS).
224
 The PPV contract 
requires that “[t]he Government will witness products received at the 
loading docks (or specified delivery location) and sign delivery receipt 
documents before the PPV driver departs.”
225
 The court acknowledges that 
the level of supervision in the PPV contract falls short of the case it cites in 
support, Bennet v. MIS Corp., but brushes the issue to the side because “the 
PPV Contract provides recourse in the event the government is not satisfied 
with an order.”
226
 However, the court fails to provide examples of what this 
recourse entails. Rather, to further justify the relationship, the court made 
the claim that a fine on McKesson not based on the contract is further proof 
that “McKesson’s actions are heavily monitored and regulated.”
227
  
To say that the PPV contract is both so regulated by the government that 
McKesson “cannot act (i.e., distribute) without direction from the VA[,]”
228
 
while simultaneously acknowledging that the contract does not meet the 
level of “supervision and involvement” of the government in the Bennett 
case is a questionable contention on its own. For the court to then claim that 
McKesson is adequately supervised by the contract because of a fine not 
based on the contract, it is unclear what the actions support the decision.  
The Cherokee Nation’s primary contention against McKesson has 
always been that actions taken by the company, whether negligent or 
willful, allowed for massive amounts of opioids to be diverted into Indian 
Country in violation of the PPV contract. In particular, the Tribe claims that 
because the alleged conduct violated the PPV contract, there is no causal 
nexus between the contract and the alleged conduct.
229
 However, the court 
did away with this particular allegation because it was made against the 
“acting under” prong, and this prong “is not concerned with the specific 
actions actually taken by McKesson . . . .”
230
 Thus, the court did not 
consider the allegation that McKesson violated the contract as related to the 
“causal nexus” prong. 
                                                                                                             
 224. Id. at 1070.  
 225. Id. at 1071 (quoting document 29-3 of document no. 1:18-OP-45695 at 40).  
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Finally, as to the federal officer removal statute, the court determined 
that McKesson met the “relatively low bar” of the colorable federal defense 




The Cherokee Nation is one of only two tribes to bring an action against 
the pharmaceutical defendants in tribal court. Despite its best efforts to 
avoid federal court, the Nation will find itself in federal court following the 
denial of its remand motion in In re National Prescription Opiate Litigation. 
The court began its analysis by explaining that “[w]hile some circuits have 
taken a more narrow view of removal under the federal officer removal 
statute, the Sixth Circuit has endorsed the broad scope of the . . . 
statute . . . .”
232
  
The liberal construction of the federal officer removal statute tips the 
scales to McKesson and is especially problematic when the defendant is a 
large corporation. The stated intent of the federal officer removal statute is 
to allow federal officers the opportunity to assert federal defenses against 
the claims that are raised.
233
 All of the Cherokee Nation’s claims in state 
court are state law claims. While it is true that federal courts are courts of 
general jurisdiction and can preside over state law claims, state courts are 
also courts of general jurisdiction, so there is no reason that the state court 
cannot hear the federal defense. 
The outcome of In re National Prescription Opiate Litigation will have 
significant implications on the legal battle against the opioid crisis. Not 
only has the Cherokee Nation been deprived of the opportunity to sue 
McKesson, and likely the other opioid defendants, in either tribal or state 
court, now other tribes will be wary of bringing actions in their own courts. 
While this case does not specifically implicate tribal jurisdiction, it is surely 
part of a trend working against tribal sovereignty. A tribe’s right to sue its 
own courts, under its own laws, is a key component of its status as a 
sovereign nation. Without a robust foundation of federal case law that 
supports that sovereignty, federal Indian law will continue to serve as a 
detriment to tribal sovereignty. Part IV will discuss how the major cases in 
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federal Indian law have led to the situation today where federal courts do 
not respect the importance of tribal sovereignty. 
IV. Applying the History of Tribal Jurisdiction 
to the Opioid Crisis Litigation 
The analysis below will illustrate how the long history of the tribal-
federal relationship, beginning with the Marshall Trilogy cases and ending 
with the most recent policy decision by the current administration, has led 
to this crisis point.  
A. The Marshall Trilogy Cases 
The “discovery doctrine” existed for hundreds of years before the 
Supreme Court made its first interpretation in Johnson v. M’Intosh.
234
 In 
this case, however, the Court held the European nation that “discovered” 
the land held the only legitimate title.
235
 The Court reasoned that it was 
prudent to distinguish the sovereignty of tribes from that of an independent 
nation with full property rights, limiting their land rights to that of 
occupancy.
236
 The decision was the first blow to tribal sovereignty, putting 
the authority of the tribes as secondary to that of the federal government. 
While M’Intosh is no longer an oft cited case in Indian law, its impact on 
the jurisdictional issues faced by the Cherokee Nation’s opioid litigation 
should not be overlooked. M’Intosh set in motion the legal and moral 
justifications behind the conquest of the American continent and the 
genocide of its native people.
237
  
Following the M’Intosh decision, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the 
State of Georgia passed legislation destroying the governmental authority 
of the Cherokee Nation and bringing its people and lands under control of 
the state government.
238
 The Cherokee Nation filed suit to enjoin the 
legislation in federal court.
239
 Marshall, writing for the Court, declined 
jurisdiction over the case. “He determined that the tribes were ‘domestic 
dependent nations’ and characterized the tribes relationship to the United 
States as resembling ‘that of a ward to his guardian.’”
240
 Marshall was in 
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effect establishing the government’s view that tribes were not independent 
nations for purposes of original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court. This 
decision would become the justification needed for Congress to exert 
plenary power over Indian tribes.
241
 It also confirmed the inevitability set in 
motion by M’Intosh: the idea that tribal authority is not only secondary to, 
but is in fact, under direct control of the federal government. 
While M’Intosh and Cherokee Nation made it clear that tribes were not 
on the same plane as a foreign nation, Worcester v. Georgia established that 
tribes could withstand the intrusion of state governments into their internal 
affairs. Marshall, again writing for the Court, found that tribes and 
individual states enjoy political independence from one another: “The 
Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own territory, 
with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can 
have no force . . . .”
242
 The result of Worcester v. Georgia, if taken on its 
own, put tribes on the same level as states within the dual sovereignty 
system. In Both McKesson v. Hembree and In re National Opiate 
Litigation, the Cherokee Nation argued that this status should give them the 
right to assert jurisdiction over the opioid defendants in tribal court. No 
federal court that reviewed the litigation acknowledged these arguments. 
The remaining discussion below will further explain how, despite 
Worcester v. Georgia, federal policy and court decisions have diminished 
tribal sovereignty. 
B. Federal Indian Law and the Politically Motivated Jig 
The Marshall Trilogy cases set the stage on which political actors stand 
as they dance the dance of federal Indian policy. This dance is not one that 
has been rehearsed or even choreographed. Instead, policymakers can move 
as the winds of politics shift around them. Under Worcester, tribal nations 
began to establish political footing, but as white settlement pushed toward 
the Mississippi River, President Andrew Jackson put pressure on Congress 
to act in the interest of settlement.
243
 Congress passed the Indian Removal 
Act
244
 on May 28, 1830. The Act made legal the voluntary removal of the 
tribes.
245
 Jackson hoped that by stipulating for the “negotiated” removal of 
the tribes to the western territories, he could allow for continued settlement, 
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prevent further conflicts between the tribes and settlers, and maintain 
separate status for the tribes.
246
 Expansion continued west, and it soon 
became clear that a new policy was needed to deal with the increasing 
struggle between settlers and tribes. 
Congress passed the Dawes Act in 1887,
247
 moving toward a policy of 
assimilation. The Dawes Act dismantled tribal governments and 
“transform[ed] the Indians into farmers, that being the quickest route to 
assimilation.”
248
 The Dawes Act divided reservation land and allotted it to 
individual members in trust for twenty-five years.
249
 The trust would then 
convert to ownership in fee, with the land and its owner then under the 
authority of federal and state laws.
250
 The Act also allowed for any land 
remaining after allotment to be sold to non-Indians.
251
 “The end of the 
allotment era saw approximately two thirds of Indian lands converted to 
non-Indian ownership and very little progress toward the assimilation of 
Indians . . . .”
252
 Although the assimilation of individual Indians could not 
be achieved through allotment, it did trigger the destruction of the tribal 
system of governance.  
Having successfully dismantled the existing tribal system in order to 
facilitate swifter settlement of the west, by 1934 the government was ready 
to “remedy some of the damage [it] had caused.”
253
 The Indian 
Reorganization Act (IRA)
254
 allowed tribes to reestablish a government 
based on models provided by the federal government.
255
 The effect of the 
IRA was that tribes could establish some semblance of self-governance, just 
without the full sovereignty that they enjoyed prior to the Dawes Act.  
Federal Indian policy shifted again in the mid-1950s, when House 
Concurrent Resolution 108 was passed in 1953,
256
 instituting what is now 
known as the termination era. In the name of “Indian emancipation,” 109 
tribes and bands were dismantled, turning over control to the states where 
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they were located (California, Florida, New York, and Texas).
257
 Another 
shift occurred in the 1970s when President Nixon redirected federal Indian 
policy towards self-determination.
258
 That policy preference carried through 
the Obama administration. President Obama instituted a policy of 
administrative interaction that described tribes as “sovereign nations” and 




President Trump has not been as friendly to tribes as his predecessor. On 
September 7, 2018, Department of the Interior (DOI) Assistant Secretary 
Tara Sweeney “pave[d] the way for a reservation to be taken out of trust for 
the first time since the termination era.”
260
  
This series of schizophrenic policy shifts and legislation has caused great 
harm to Native American people and crippled many tribes’ abilities to 
support a functioning government. The federal government only recognized 
tribal sovereignty until it became a hindrance to western settlement, at 
which point the government destroyed the systems that tribes had 
developed over many centuries. Once settlers had stretched to the far 
western ranges of the United States and Indians were no longer a threat, the 
federal government attempted to bring the tribes back through the IRA, but 
not to the way they existed prior to settlement. Under the IRA, the federal 
government pressured newly recognized tribes to organize themselves like 




In this way, the government exerted control over the tribes by breaking 
them down and then building them back up in its own image. As tribes 
began to rebuild, America emerged victorious from World War II, and a 
new era of American Exceptionalism was born.
262
 Tribal self-determination 
soon became antithetical to the “American way”; instead, Native Americans 
would assimilate into the mainstream of society or risk being cast out as un-
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 Termination was unsuccessful in achieving its stated goal to 
“civilize and assimilate”
264 
Native Americans, but it was successful at yet 
again damaging tribal governments and the social safety net established 
during the previous era.
265
 Each cycle of dismantling and reconstructing 
takes power away from tribal governments. 
The damage to tribal sovereignty has been done, and the results are borne 
in both in the opioid crisis, and in the Cherokee Nation’s opioid litigation. 
Tribal members are far more likely to become addicted to substances like 
prescription opioids and illicitly-manufactured fentanyl because of the harm 
caused to the tribal way of life by the tumult of the federal-Indian 
relationship. Similarly, tribal sovereignty has been greatly diminished from 
the days of Worcester v. Georgia. Where tribes once stood on equal footing 
with states in the dual sovereignty system, resulting in part to the ever-
shifting landscape of federal Indian policy, tribes today are subject to court 
decisions that threaten their ability to protect their own citizens. In filing its 
action in tribal court, the Cherokee Nation sought to right not only the 
wrongs done to its members by the opioid defendants, but perhaps also to 
right the wrongs that have been done to Indians across this country for 
hundreds of years. Until tribes can retain the status they once held alongside 
states, decisions like McKesson and In re National Prescription Opioid 
Litigation will continue to threaten the tribal way of life.  
VI. Conclusion 
The opioid crisis has wreaked havoc on tribal communities across the 
country. The Cherokee Nation attempted to assert its sovereign authority to 
protect its people, but it was denied that authority by the Northern District 
of Oklahoma. Since the decision in McKesson, the Cherokee Nation joined 
with the State of Oklahoma in a similar action in state court. Again, the 
Tribe’s ability to sue in a venue of its choosing was thwarted by a federal 
court. This time District Court for the Northern District of Ohio removed 
the Tribe’s action in state court to federal court under the federal officer 
removal statute. The decision resulted in the Tribe’s case again being 
removed to federal court.  
These two decisions have forced the Tribe to pursue its causes of action 
exclusively in federal court. Looking back, there is a bit of sad irony 
surrounding the ultimate results of these two cases. The court in McKesson 
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v. Hembree relied in part on the idea that the Tribe would indeed have a 
choice of venue after being denied jurisdiction in tribal court.
266
 However, 
the Northern District of Ohio’s decision in In re National Prescription 
Opioid Litigation proved that reliance to be unfounded. These decisions are 
a retelling of an old story; the Tribe asserted its jurisdiction, but the federal 
judiciary saw fit to deny that authority, instead asserting its own jurisdiction 
over the claims in a “take it or leave it” fashion.  
The relationship between the tribes and the U.S. government is littered 
with decisions that have limited tribal sovereignty and prevented tribal 
governments from realizing their full potential to govern tribal citizens. 
These decisions and the end results are no different, and until the federal 
judiciary recognizes the importance of tribal sovereignty, can expect that 
old story to continue to their peril. 
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